SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 29, 1874.

GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON ON THE WAR. arrative of military operations directed du ng the late War between the States, by Jo-seph E. Johnston, General, C. S. A. 110s-trated by steel plates and maps. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 549 and 551 Broad-way, 1873.

offer these pages as my contribution of ma-terials for the use of the future historian of the War between the States.

The Messrs. Appleton & Co., of New York, have placed us under obligations for an advanced copy of the best contribution to the history of the war between the States yet offered to the public. Dealing, as it does, with the organization, maneuvres and battles of the Confederate armies, their material and commanding generals, as well as the civil government and the people who exhibited so noble and enduring a patriotism during the prolonged and terrible contest, and the work of one of the greatest commanders on either side, a man of known character as a soldier, the first of living strategists, conspicuous as an actor in all the events he describes, and a military critic without a superior in the Union, we regard it with favor from the start. We have nothing to offer one way or other in support or extenuation of the feud between General Johnston and President Davis, which is necessarily very prominent in every chapter of this work. We will let that speak for itself in the extracts we shall make, only putting ourselves on record as not merely admirers of President Davis, but as sensible of the debt of gratitude the people of the south owe him for his patriotic and unselfish devotion to their cause; for a conscientious endeavor, however it may sometimes have been warped by personality, to promote the true interests of the southern States, to achieve their independence and make them free. We desire to give assurance, no matter what may appear in the lines that follow, of a high respect for Mr. Davis, founded upon knowledge of his purity of character, his long service in public life, in the Union and the Confederacy, his great ability as a statesman, and his attainments as a soldierpronounced by a prominent federal general "a master of the art of war," we shall not attempt either to sit in judgment as critics upon the work of General Johnston, a work that we believe will satisfy all soldierly anticipation of his ability, and that is destined to spread an enduring fame, and raise him still higher in the esteem of the southern people, of whom ne says that they always spoke of him from the heart and not the brain. Brave, discreet, resolute, firm, possessed of all the intuitions of the great soldier, thoroughly trained, experienced in two wars that tested the metal and skill of our little army, with a mind well-balanced, poised to a point of judicial fairness, humane, kindly dispositioned and thoroughly intelligent as to the resources of the sections, it was impossible for "Joe" Johnston, as we still love to speak of him here where he fought best and is best known, to be other than a great soldier. He possessed ail the essentials and never failed to make himself felt as such by the enemy, even after his army had dwindled to the numbers of a corps, without commissariat or stores, and when the very horses of the staff looked the "genius of starvation." Clear-headed and possessed of a large fund of common sense, we expected General Johnston, the idel of the west, would give us just such a book as is before us-clear, cogent, logical, and irresistible in its deductions. It embraces the whole period of the war, from the ordinance of secession by Virginia to the surrender at Hillsboro, North Carolina, and describes nearly all the great and eventful military movements of the eastern and western departments. The first three pages embrace a plain statement of his resignation from the old army," and a defense of himself and comrades from the aspersions of northern editors and politicians, who used to characterize all officers of either branch of the United States service, who entered the Confederate service, as perjured. On the second page we find a paragraph, which we will quote, for interest it will have for the general reader, as indexing the rupture with President Davis, and pointing a way to the series of mortifications General Johnston endured in being so often superceded by subordinates, and too often

nimself, he says: No other officer of the United States army equal rank, that of brigadier-general, respuished his position in it to join the South

Further on the bearing of these four ines will be perceptible. It will be seen that General Johnston was the ranking officer of the Confederacy by law, and that by ignoring the fact the comman-der-in-chief, at the very first of the organization of the army, inflicted a wound that no soldier could forget, although, like a true patriot, Johnston continued to the last to serve his country wherever and whenever ordered. But, as we have said, we shall let this speak for itself, and move as rapidly brough the work as the interest our readers have in it will permit, and as want of space will compel. By way of introduction, we are told of his quick letermination to resign, of his prompt departure from Washington, and his entrance upon duty at Richmond by assignment of Governor Letcher, with the rank of major-general, and we are at once launched into the details of the preliminaries for the first contest between northern and southern troops at Buli Run. Our readers will not expect us to follow him in these columns with anything like the particularity that characterizes the book; want of space orbids-suffice it that he enters into the movements of the troops in and about Harper's Ferry and Bull Run and the battle itself with the zest of the true soldier, recounting and describing graphically and yet with care, and carrying the unmilitary reader along with the confidence of perfect understanding of the movements and distribution of the raw levies that during the first months of 1861 gave such promise of the afterward splendid achievements of the army of Northern Virginia. Of the result of "Bull Run" he says, sum-

Some half-hour after the termination of a battle, the President rode upon the field, or facted from Manassas station by Lieutena Colonel Jordan. He had strived there from Richmond when the strangle had just closed, and had, doubtless, hurried out to take part in it. The crowd of fugitives he had seen from his railroad-ca*, before reaching the from his railroad-car, before reaching the station, had so strongly impressed upon his nind the idea that we were defeated, that it

at eleven o'clock the disparity of numnoon; at eleven o clock the disparity of num-bers was much greater.

Considering the length of time in which the troops were engaged at short range, the losses were small in relation to their numbers. That of the Confederate was: in the army of the Shenandoah two hundred and seventy-killed, nine hundred and seventy-nine wounded, eighteen missing; in that of the Potomac, one hundred and cight killed, five bundred and ten wounded, tweive missing. Actal, three hundred and seventy-night killed, fourteen hundred and eighty-nine wounded, thirty missing. That of the Federal army could not be as-

certained by us accurately. Including prisoners, it must have been about four thousand. ers, it must have been about four thousand. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery, four thousand five handred muskets, almost half a million cartridges, a garrison-flag, and ten regimental colors were taken on the field, or near it in the pursuit, besides sixty-four aftillery-horses, with their harness, twenty-six wagons, and camp-coulpage, clothing and other military property.

The southern infantry had great advantage over the porthern in their greater famillarity with fire arms. It was the reverse, however, over the northern in their greater familiarity with fire arms. It was the reverse, however, in relation to the artillery; for that of the south had had neither time nor ammunition for practice, while much of that of the north belonged to the regular service. Still, ours, directed principally by Colonel Pendleton, was more effective even than the regular batteries of the United States army, in that battle.

The pursuit was pressed as long as it was the pursuit was pressed as long as it was effective. But when the main column of retreating infantry was encountered, after the parties in its rear and on the fishks had been dispersed or captured, our cavairy found itself too weak to make any serious impression, and attenual with the reference. returned with the prisoners already taken. The infantry was not required to pursue far from the field, because by doing so it would have been harrassed to no purpose. It is well known that infantry, unencombered by bagge-trains, can easily escape pursuing infantry.

The victory was as complete as one gained In a victory was as complete as one gasted by infantry and artillery only can be.

If the tantics of the federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed into two lines, with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two southern breades must have been swent from the ern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a forma-tion, probably, had he not greatly under-esti-mated the strength of his enemy. The President remained at Manassas Junc-tion until nine or ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-hird, employed chiefly in matm brigades must have been swept from the f the twenty-third, employed chiefly in maters of military organization. When I recom mended to him General Beauregard's promo-tion to the grade of general in the Confederate army, he informed me that the nomination had already been written, or determined on. He also promoted Colonel Elzey, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Jones, and Major-General W. H. C. Colonel S. Jones, and Major-General W. H. C. Whiling to brigadier-generalcles. He offered me the command in Western Virginia, subsequently conferred on General Lee, promising to increase the forces there adequately from the army around us. In replying, Lexpressed the opinion that the government of the United States would organize a great army near Washington, which would be ready for offensive operations before the end of the fall, when we might expect another invasion on a offensive operations before the end of the fall, when we might expect another invasion on a much larger scale than that just defeated. Being in position to command against it. I was unwilling to be removed to a much less important though more immediate service.

If the tone of the press indicated public opinion and feeling in the south, my fallure to capture Washington received strong and general condemnation. Many erroneously attributed it to the President's prohibition; but he gave no orders, and expressed neither wish nor opinion on the subject, that ever came to my knowledge. Considering the relative strength of the belligereads on the field, the southern people could not reasonably have expected greater results from their victory than those accomplished—the defeat of

terate army was more disorganized by vic-y than that of the United States by defeat the southern volunteers believed that the ob-jects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obli-gations, left the army—not to retain. Some

Besides these adverse conditions of the army for a movement on Washington he also enumerates the unfitness of the troops for marching, want of supplies of food and ammunition, the fortifications manued by fifty thousand federals, the Potomac a mile wide, the want of means of beseiging, and the general condition of unpreparedness of the government to sustain no le s than to undertake so

nerculcan a task. The third chapter, besides that it gives us notes of preparation during the summer, treats of the want of preparation for the struggle, of the Projid it's visit to the camp at Fairfax Courthouse, the battle of Leesburg and the affair at Drainsville; also, at some length gives the facts and the low in regard to the appointment of the five generals and the preference shown Cooper, Lee and Albert Sydney Johnston. We will let him tell this himself. He si ys:

It was reported, about the end of Augus hat General A. S. Johnston, coming from fornia by the southern (land) route, had ered the Confederacy; and, on the thirty first of the month, the President nominated two persons to be generals in the Confederate army: First, S. Ceoper, to rank from May 16th, the date of the law creating the grade; second, A. S. Johnston, to rank from May 28th; third, E. E. Lee, from June 14th; fourth, J. E. Johnston, from July 4th; and, fifth, G. T. Beauregard, from July 28st, the date of the appointment previously conferred upon him.(a)

This notion was allowather illegal and conaws were: First—The act of March 6th, fixing the mili-try establishment of the Confederacy, and roviding for four brigadier-generals, that be

ing the highest grade created,

'econd—The act of March 14th, adding a
fifth brigadier-general, and authorizing the
President to assign one of the five to the dudies of adjutant and inspector-general; and,
Third—Enacting further, 'that in all cases
of officers who have resigned, or who may,
within six months, tender their resignations
from the army of the United States, and who
have been, or may be appointed to original
vacancies in the army of the Confederate
States, the commissions issued shall bear one
and the same date, so that the relative rank
of officers of each grade shall be determined
by their former commissions in the United sterfered with, as the public generally believed, to the detriment of the interby their former commissions in the United States army, here anterior to the seccession of these Confederate States from the United States. ests of the Confederacy. Speaking of

and denomination of general, instead of brigadier-general, which shall be the highest military grade known to the Confederate States. Appointments to the rank of general, after the army is organized, shall be made by selection from the army."

Under the first act, S. Cooper, R. E. Lee, and myself, were brigadier-generals on the sixteenth of May, when the fourth was approved; and under the third ranked relatively, as we had done in the United States army before secession, when I was brigadier-general, General Cooper colonel, and General Lee Hentennt-colonel in that army. The passage of the fourth act made us generals; and, according to military rule, without affecting this relative rank. It also abolished the grade of origidier-general in the army to which we beionged.

of rank established by law was—first, J. E. Johnston (brigadier-general United States army); second, S. Cooper (colonel United States army); third, A. S. Johnston (colonel United States army); fourth, R. E. Lee (lieu-tenant-colenel United States army); G. T. Beauregard (captain United States army). The change in the legal arrangement was made by my removal from the first place on the list to the fourth.

Information of these nominations, and their confirmation, came to me at the same time. On receiving it, I wrote to the President such a statement as the preceding, and also expressed my sense of the wrong done me. But, in order that sense of injury might not betray me into the use of language improper from an officer to the President, I laid aside the letter for two days, and then examined it dispassion. officer to the Fresident, I laid aside the letter for two days, and then examined it dispassion-ately, I believe; and was confident that what It contained was not improper to be said by a soldier to the Fresident, nor improperly said. The letter was, therefore, dispatched. It is said that It irritated him greatly, and that his irritation was freely expressed. The animosity against me that he is known to

have entertained ever since, was attr by my acquaintances in public life, i mond at the time, to this letter. From this personal digression we come again to the army, which was re-organized in four divisions, commanded and never could have been, were it not by Van Dorn, G. W. Smith, Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson, of whom and their brigade commanders he says briefly that "no army composed of new troops ever had general officers of more merit." The operations at and preceding the affair at Leesburg have full at- as to the condition of affairs in Bragg's tention, and the third chapter is closed army, although both were based on the with this summary of the events of 1861, same information. In his answer to and the situation "all around" at the President General Johnston pressed

provide northest C.or.

seat of war, instead of Mississippi and Tennessee.

Among the measures to hold Tennessee and gain Kentucky were entrenched camps, made at Columbus, Island No. 10, Forts Henry and Donelson, and Bowling Green, each of which required an army to hold it; and, consequently, a respectable army divided axiong them, gave each one a force utterly inadequate to its defense. Regular forts each requiring a garrison of one or two thousand men, and constructed with much less aborthan the entrenched camps, would have held the ground much better, and made it practically to form an active army at the same canie to form an active army at the same time, capable of fasing those of Buell and Grant, one after the other. As it was, the Confederates were altho weak at every point, and, when the federal armies advanced, they were captured, or abandoned the country pre-cipitately, after much misdirected labor had been expended in preparations to defend it.

The fourth chapter is taken up with he movement from Manassas to the Rappahannock and the Rapidan; the battle of Kernstown; exchange of prisoners; the well-remembered interference of Secretary Benjamin with Stone-wall Jackson, and that splendid soldier's resignation, which was intercepted by General Johnston, and, by his persua-sion, was finally withdrawn, thus contihuing to the country the services of the most wonderfully quick and dashng executant of the Confederacy. Benjamin's misconduct is presented in ver-glaring colors, also the "goose-gabble" of the cabinet, some one of whom would cackle the intended movement of the troops, and the orders and suggestions of the executive, much to the endanger-ing of their success. There is also a de-fense of his first Fanian movement, and a very interesting report of the conference at Richmond, at which were the President, Secretary of War Randolph, Generals Lee and Johnston, and Major-Generals W. G. Smith and Longstreet

At this conference he proposed that-Instead of only delaying the federal army in its approach, it should be encountered in front of Richmond by one quite as numerous formed by uniting there all the available forces in the Confederacy in North Carolina forces in the Confederacy in North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, with those at Norfolk, on the Peninsula, and theu near Richmond, the Juding Smith sond Longsfreet's Richmond, the Juding Smith sond Longsfreet's army thus formed, surprising that of the United States by an attack when it was expecting to besiege Richmond, would be simost certain to win; and the enemy defeated a hundred miles from Fort Monroe, their place of refuge, could scarcely escape destruction. Such a victory would decide, not only the campaign, but the war, while the present plan could produce no decisive result.

General Lee opposed it, because he thought that the withdrawal from South Carolina and Georgia of any considerable number of troops would expose the important scaports of Charleston and Savannah to the danger of Charleston made the cantel the Market Helds of battle for a small army contending with a great one, and that we should for that reason make the contest with McClellan's army there. General Longstreet took little part, which I attributed to his ideafness. The discussion was continued until one o'clock in the morning, when the President, who previously had expressed no opinion on the question, announced his decision in favor of General Lee's opinion, and directed that Smith's and Longstreet's divisions should join the army of the Peninsula,

The fifth chapter gives Magruder's defensive preparations for the battle of Williamsburg, the affair near Eltham, the withdrawal across the Chickahom-iny, advance of the federals, and battle of Beven Pines, where, it will be remem-bered, the general was wounded. The movements before and during this battle are given with great particularity, and The claims of the same officers to decide

horoughly beaten the day before by five confederate brigades.

The authors of Alfriend's Life of J flerson Dovis, and come other biographers, represent, only disparagement, that the army with white General L. e fought in "the seven days" which General L efought in "the seven days" was the same army which I be I commanded, it is very far from the truth. General Leidid not attack the enemy until the twenty-sixth of June, because he we employed from the first until then, in forming a great army, by oringing to that which I command d, fifteen thousand (b) men from North Carolina, under Major-General Holmes. (c) twenty-two thousand from South Carolina and Georgia, and above sixteen thousand men from "the valley" in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell, which the victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic had rendered disposable.

The sixth charact begins with his as-

The sixth chapter begins with his as covered from his wounds-on the twelfth of November, as commander of the united departments of Tenues ee and Mississippi. At this time General Lee's army had been reorganized, and was in high condition, and much stronger than when it fought in Maryland; that to which it was opposed, however, being still stronger in numbers. General Bragg had returned from his expedition into Kentucky, and was placing at Murfreesboro' the army he had received at Tupelo—outnumbered greatly, however, by the federal forces in and near Nashville, commanded by Major-General Rosecrans. Lieutenant-General Pemberton, recently appointed to command the department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, had garrisons thought to be adequate, in Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and an active army of twentythree thousand menon the Tallahatchie observing the Federal army of for ty-five thousand men under Major-General Grant, between that river and Holly Springs. In Arkansas, Lieutenant-

General Holmes, who commanded the Trans-Mississippi department, had a large army, supposed to amount to fifty-five thousand men, the main body, near Little Rock, opposed to no enemy, except garrisons, at Helens, and perhaps at one or two other points on the Mississippi. This will be found a chapter of absorbing interest, recounting, as it does, the movements of Morgan, the battle of Murfreesboro, the attack on VanDorn at Franklin, and the movements of Pemberton near Vicksburg, Jackson and Port Hudson.

The seventh chapter gives his arrival at Jackson, assumption of chief command. Pemberton's retreat across Big Black to Vicksburg, orders to evacuate that weakhold, investment of it by the enemy, and he surrender and retiring of the army to Jackson. This and the succeeding chapter will prove decidedly interesting reading to people hereabouts. The latter treats of Sherman's advance on and destruction of Jackson, reviews the Mississippi campaign, and answers, with great severity, the report of General Pemberton, and the letter of President Davis, commenting, as he says, harshly on his military conduct. This letter is given in full, with the answer to it, dated at Morton, Mississippi, August 8, 1863. They are too lengthy for reproduction in the APPEAL now, but may be given hereafter.

The ninth chapter finds him at Dalton, in command of the army of Ten-nessee, and opens with the letter of assignment to that duty by Secretary of War Seddon, a letter that smacks very much of unbecoming patronage—a pat-ronage that is characteristic of too many of the official documents published in this history. The answer to this letter, like all the anwers of the general to letters from official sources, is plain and pointed, sometimes the severity of re-buke being ill-concealed behind a thin veil of official etiquette. One reads these letters, and wonders at the endurance of such a man-an endurance unfolded so plainly here. A letter from the President, beginning on page two hun-

Triple B. PERTEUR, Belley

five hundred mess into battle that day, in his division, and the latter libree thousand seven hundred in his brigade. From these indications it may reasonably be inferred that the three federal divisions on the field were about two to one compared with the Confederator, at four o'clock, and four to one at the confederator, at four o'clock, and four to one at the confederator, at four o'clock, and four to one at the confederator, at four o'clock, the disparity of purposes of the Confederator, and Bowling Green, each of the Army of the Tennessee, which assailed his corps, at twenty-five the undered.

I think that the estimate of the Army of the Tennessee, which assailed his corps, at twenty-five the would have secured to us the many think we would to-day be independent to the character of General Report of the Tennessee, which assailed his corps, at twenty-five the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, hundred.

I think that the estimate of the Army of the Tennessee, hundred.

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I think that the estimate of the Army of the Tennessee, which assailed his corps, at twenty-five the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Blonetal means of carrying on war for years, the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Interest the two Johnstons, Beauregard and Int Rionewall Jackson, and freed the negro on condition of his military service, many think we would to-day be independent. We would, from the first, have had, at least, the sympathy, instead of the opposition, of the civilized world, and having no political distractions, no congress of mischievous politicians, nothing but liberty to think of or labor for, we could not fail to have ticians, nothing but liberty to think of or labor for, we could not fail to have succeeded. But we digress. Toward the conclusion of the ninth chapter, we find complaint of want of sup-plies, of weevil-eaten corn, and short rations for "man and beast," also that "there was a great deficiency of blank-ets;" and "it was painful to see the number of bare feet in every regi-ment." Two of four brigades in-

spected could not march for want of shoes, and there was a deficiency in the infantry of six thousand small arms. The artillery horses were still feeble, and it would have been impossible to have maneuvered the batteries in action or to have marched them on an ordinary road. The closing paragraph of this very interesting chapter, is a brief review and full refutation of General Thomas's re-port to General Grant of the operations at Mill creek. The tenth chapter is taken up with the disposition of the troops, the affair at Dug Gap, the cavalry fight at Varnell's station, the fighting at Resaca, Wheel-er's encounter with Stoneman's cavalry, and the withdrawal of the army from Resaca to meet the flanking movement of the enemy. The correspondence of the general with General Bragg as the President's chief of staff with the army of Tennessee, is very in-structive, as throwing full light upon the questions of the offensive or defensive policy, and the disobedience of executive orders, with which General Johnston then stood charged. This, and the eleventh chapter, are by far the | al's

sians, recounting as they do all the operations of the army of the Tennessee, from Dalton to Atlanta, and the assignment of Hood to command. to Atlanta and up to the removal of Johnston. In the course of it General Hood is keenly criticised, and his re-ports in several instances disproved by the concurrent testimony of many leading general-officers. We read familiar names—Bate, A. P. Stewart, Cheatham, Cleburne, Polk, Forrest, Wheeler, Jackson, Hardee, Armstrong, Bragg, and others. Among the more interesting passages in this chapter, we find this, embracing the General's explanation of the causes for leaving Dalton, as fol-

The disposition of the Confederale army about Daiton was predicated on the belief that the federal general would stack it there with his whole force. For that reason its entire strength was confentrated there, and the protection of its communications left to Lieutenant-General Polk's troops, then on their way from Alabama, through Rome, to join us. I supposed, from General Sherman's great superiority of numbers, that he intended to decide the confest by a battle, and that he would make that battle as near his own and as far from our baseas possible—that is to say, at Daiton. On general principles, that was his operations, then and subsequently, were de-ermined by the relative forces of the trules, and a higher estimate of the northern soldiers than southern editors and oliticians were accustemed to express, or yen the administration seemed to entertain. its opinion had been formed in much ser-ce with them against the Indians, and four five battles in Mexico—such actions, at est, as were then called battles. Observaleast, as were then called battles. Observation of almost twenty years of service of this sort had impressed on my mind the belief that the soidlers of the regular army of the United States—almost all northern men—were equal, in fighting qualities, to any that had been formed in the wars of Great Britain and France. General Sherman's troops, with whom we were contending, had received a longer training in war than any of those with whom I had served in former times. It was not to be supposed that such troops, under a sagacious and resolute leader, and covered by retronchments, were to be beaten by greatly inferior numbers. I therefore thought it our policy to stand on the defensive, to spare the blood of our soidlors by fighting uners cover habiltanily, and to attack only when had position or division of the enemy's forces might give us advantages counterbalancing that of superior numbers. So we held every position occupied until our communications were strongly threatened, then fell back only far enough to secure them, watching for opportunities to attack, keeping near enough to he deral army to assure the confederate admin-

enough to secure them, watching for opportunities to attack, keeping near enough to the federal army to assure the Confederate administration that Sherman could not send reinforcements to Grant, and hoping to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. A material reduction of the federal army might also be reasonably expected before the end of June, by the expiration of the terms of service of the regiments that had not re-enlisted. I was confident, too, that the administration would see the expediency of employing Forrest and his cavalry to break the enemy scall-road communications, by which he could have been defeated.

The account of the battle of the Ken-esaw mountain we make room for in fall, with its sterling tribute to the northern soldiers and to the southern infantry that followed him so long, and to the last paid him admiring and loving devotion. He says: In the morning of the twenty-seventh, after

urisus canonade, the federal army made a neral assault upon the Confederate post-on, which was received everywhere with mane's, and repelled with a loss to the aswhich they infileted. At several points the characteristic fortitude of the northwestern soldiers held them under a close and desiructive fire long after reasonable hope of success was gone. The attack upon Loring's corps was by the Army of the Tennessee: that upon Hardee's by the Army of the Cumberland. The principal efforts of the enemy were directed against Loring's right and left brigades, and the left of Handee's corps.

The attack upon Loring's right—Scott's brigade of Featherston's division—was by troops of the seventeenth corps, advancing in three lines, preceded by skirmishers. They received five or six volleys from Nelson's (twelfth Louisiana) regiment, deployed as skirmishers, in rifle-pits, six hundred yards in front of the brigade. This regiment held its ground until the first federal line had approached within twenty-five paces. It then retired to the line of battle. The federal troops advanced steadily, and two hundred paces from the Confederate line met the fire of Scott's lifantry, and received in their flanks that of four batteries, This concentrated fire compelled them to halt. Unable to advance further, and unwilling to refreat, they remained where they had halted almost an hour, before withdrawing from the shower of missiles.

Buring this time a single line of federal in-

an hour, before withdrawing from the shower of missiles.

During this time a single line of federal infantry was engaged with Wheeler's troops, the skirmishers of Featherston's own, and Adams's brigades, and those of Quarles's brigade of Walthall's division—alt in the shelter of rifle-pits. The firing was always within easy, and very frequently short range. A body of the assailants charged into Quarles's rifle-pits, where most of them were killed or captured.

In the assault upon Loring's left (Cockrell's Missouri brigade) the assailants advanced rapidly from the west—their right extending to the south of the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, and their left encountering the brigade (Scars's) on Cockrell's right. Their right dashed through the skirmishers of Walker's right before they could be reinforced, and took in reverse those on the right and left, while they were attacked in front. In a few minutes about eighty of Walker's men had been bayonneted or captured in their rifle-pits. The federal troops approaching walker's line on the south of the road were driven back by the fire of artillery directed against their left flank by Major-General French: but the main body, unchecked by Cockrell's shirmshers, pre-sed for ward steadily under the fire of the brigade, until within twenty or thirty pacer of its line. Here it was checked and ultimately repulsed, by the steady courage of the Missourians. The action had continued with spirit for almost an hour, during most of which time fifty field-pieces were playing upon the Confederate troops.

But the most determined and powerful at-

But the most determined and powerful attack fell upon Cheatham's division and the left of Cleburne's. The lines of the two armies were much nearer to each other there; therefore the action was begun at shorter range.

The federal troops were in greater force, and deeper order, too, and pressed forward with the resolution always displayed by the American soldler when property led. An attempt to turn the left was promptly met and defeated by Cheatham's reserve—Vangun's brigade, After maintaining the contest for three-quarters of an hour, until more of their best soldiers lay dead and wounded than the number of British veterans that fell in General Jackson's celebrated battle of New Orleans, the foremost dead lying against our breastworks, they retired—unsuccessful—because they had encountered interactor infantry unsurpassed tered fatteached infantry uns

ty thousand infantry inured to battle, and in-trenched, and of fifty field-pieces poured into such columns, frequently within pistol-shot, must have done much greater execution.

The death of the revered and lamented General Polk is thus recounted on page 337:

page 337:

In the evening of the thirleenth, Lieutenant-General Hardee expressed apprehension that Bate's division, posted on Pine Mount, might be too far from the line occupied by his corps, and requested me to visit that outpost, and decide if it should be maintained. We rode to it together next morning, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Polk, who wished to avait himself of the high to study the ground in front of his own corps.

Just when we had concluded our examination, and the abandonment of the hill had been decided upon, a party of soldiers, that had gathered behind us from mere curiosity, apparently tempted an artillery officer whose battery was in front, six or seven hundred yards from us, to open fire upon them; af first firing shot very slowly. Hentenant General Polk, unconsciously exposed by his characteristic insensibility to danger, fell by the third shot, which passed from left to right through the middle of his chest. The death of this eminent christian and soldier, who had been distinguished in every battle in which the army of Tennessee had been engaged, produced deep sorrow in our troops. Major-General Loring, the officer next in rank in the corps, succeeded temporarily to its command.

We come now to the removal from We come now to the removal from

the command of the Army of Tennessee

and the disastrous campaigu under Hood, with bloody Franklin and Nash-

ville always in view. On the seven-

teenth of July the removal, by tele-graph from the secretary of war, was handed him, and was immediately promulgated to the army; and the next day the secretary, who based this removal upon the gener-al's "failure to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of most interesting to Tennesseans, Mississippians, Alabamians and Arkan-Atlanta," was answered by the assertion that "Sherman's army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee than Grant's compared with that of northern Virginia, yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more The eleventh opens with the skirmishing at Resaca, and takes in detail all slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than the battles, affairs and maneuvres back | to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia." He then sketches for the reader as he sketched for Gen. Hood as his successor, his plan of cam-paign in and about Atlanta, recounts the suit of all the movements from the 5th of May to the 18th of July, and contrasts successfully the condi-

tion and morale of the army. He says
"The troops themselves, who had been
seventy-four days in the immediate resence of the enemy; laboring and fighting daily; enduring toil and eauntering danger with equal cheerfulness; more confident and high-spirited even than when the federal army presented itself before them at Dalton; and, though I say it, full of devotion to him who had commauded them, and belief of ultimate success in the campaigu, were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy, or fought on this continent." General Hood's report of his disastrous campaign receives athe custus for his troops that they were succe stud against the enemy, rebutting the claims of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and others of the federal army.

It is evident that is to say, at balton. On general principles, that was his true policy. It is evident that he did not so act, because he thought as 1 did—that, in the event of his assailing us, the chances would have been very strong in our favor. My own observations, then and subsequently were declared to the general sums up his narrative operations, then and subsequently were declared. as showing that the army of Tennesse did fight, and effectively; and probably inflicted upon the enemy greater injury, in proportion to that It received, than we read of in the history of any other campaign of the war-unless in General Lee's operations in May of the same yea.—its own total of losses being set down as nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two

endured—and by the sympathy and aid given in every home to all prolossing to belong to the army, or to be on the way to join it. And this spirit continued not only after all hope of success had died, but after the final confession of defeat by their military commanders. But, even if the men of the south had not been sealensin the cause, the pafriotism of their mothers and wives and sisters would have inspired them with seal or shafned them into its manifestation. The women of the southershibited that feeling wherever it could be exercised; in the armies, by distributing clothing made with their own homes, by feeding the marching soldiers; and, above all, in the hospitals, where they rivaled sisters of charity. I am happy in the belief that their devoted patriotism and gentle charity are so richly rewarded. An error in relation to the state of preparation for war, of each of the two sections of the country, in the beginning of 1881, has prevailed in the north since then. I refer to the belief that, when the Southern Confederacy was formed, the arms that had been provided by the government of the United States for the common defense were in the possession of the seceeds States. This belief was produced by the most mailgnant and industriously circulated sianders by which the reputation of any public man of the United States for the common defense were in the state; ever suffered—the accusation against John B. Floyd, of Virginia, that while secretary, of war he had all the public arms removed from the north and arm the touth for the impending war. This accusation was so southern arsenals; to disarm the north and arm the touth for the house of representatives, in January, 1881. The chairman of that committee completely econemied Mr. Floyd, and refuted the calumary. Yet it continued to be circulated and believed—while the refutation, although by such a body, was unnoticed—and, I believe, is now forgotten. The facts that were distorted into that celumny are clearly stated in the report of the committee, and must be we fide in skill, pluck and honor." The twelfth chapter is devoted to the operations of the troops under his command in Georgia, South Carolina and sidnance bureau, and recorded at concrean; for the orders in question were given through that, the proper channel. They are briefly the at Previous to the year 1859, the infantry arms manufactured under the direction of the war department had been accumulating in the Springfield armory, in consequence of the neglect of an old rule of the government which required the distribution of these arms in arsenals constructed for the purpose, in the different sections of the country. In the beginning of the year, the accumulation had fill the place of deposit at Springfield, where the newly-adopted improved arms were made. To make room there for the new arms as they were finished, Mr. Floyd ordered the removal of about a hunded and five thousand muskets (c) and ten thousand rifles, to empty southern armenals, constructed many years before to receive them, under laws of congress. These were old-fashloued arms that had been discarded by the government on account of the recent Florida, to which he was assigned on the twenty-third of February, 1865, by General Lee, then recently, and too late, made commander-in-chief. It has

in every house to all professing to belo the army, or to be on the way to join

preliminaries and adjustments of the final surrender, which sad news he announced to the troops in General Orders No. 18, the closing paragraph setting forth that "Events in Virginia, which broke every hope of success by war, imposed on its general the duty of sparing the blood of this gallant army, and of saving our country from further devastation, and our people from ruin." And he closed his connection with "these matchless old-rashloned arms that had been discarded by the government on secount of the recent improvements in small-arms, and adoption by it of the "rifled musket." About for hundred thousand of the old discarded arms and all of the new and Improved, were left if the north. About a year later two thousand rifled muskets were offered for distribution the States under an act of converse. Only soldiers" by general order twentytwo, in which he exhorted them to observe the terms of their parole, and bade them farewell in terms of affection felly equal to those they had always and have ever since expressed for him. After chapter thirteen, which we copy in full, there is another devoted to what is entitled the "unsent message" of President Davis, written for the purpose of reviewing for congress the failures of General Johnston, as they were apparent to the President, but which was never sent in to that body. This the general criticises with ability, defending himself, for the most part, with the aid of official documents that throw a clear light upon his motives and movements. For many persons this will have more attraction than any other chapter of the book, which is necessarily as much a defense as a narrative. This "unsent message" is followed by an addenda, made up from orders and reports; among the latter, one of great in-terest from Senator Wigfall. Next to

especial interest in that it contains all

the north. About a year ister two thousand risted muskets were offered for distribution to the States under an act of congress. Only seven hundred of them went to the south, however, because even then there was so little apprehension of war that several southern states refused or neglected to take their portions. Mr. Floyd's orders, as I have said, were given before secession had been thought of, or war apprehended, by the people of any part of the United States. The seceding States, in general, made no preparation for war by procuring arms—none of consequence, that is to say. I believe that Georgia procured, twenty thousand old-fashioned muskets, and Virginia had forty thousand, made in a state armory more that forty years before. They had, of course, film locks. Each of the other southern States, on execuing, claimed, and, when practicable, took possession of the military property of the United States within its limits. They obtained, in that way, the arms with which they began the war. To recapituate: the Confederate States began the war with one hundred and twenty thousand arms of obsolete models, and seven hundred of the recently adopted weapous, "rifled muskets;" and the United States with about four hundred and fifty thousand of the old and all of the modern arms that had been madeained the adoption of the new model, about the middle of General Pierce's administration, when Mr. Davis was at the head of the war department, except, however, the seven hundred held by the Confederacy. The equipped field-batteries and fired ammunition; except that at Harper's Ferry, which, being on the border, was abandoned by the United States, affer an attempt to destroy it, which left little besides machinery. this chapter, which we transfer bodily, and which gives the general's views of the causes of the collapse of the Confeder-acy, perhaps even before it, will rank that devoted to the "unsent message." But we have not space to dwell upon that, and must content ourselves with this lengthy extract, comprising the whole of the thirteenth chapter: General Johnston-right, in part-Much has been written and much more said of the cause of the overthrow of the Confederate States in their great contest for independence. One class, and much the largest—for it includes the people who were victorious in the war, and those Europeans who was their the struggle with interest as well as will find many who will dispute this chapter. As he shows himself, during 1861 there was no lack of money, and

the morals and enthusiasm of the people was at its highest; but when the blockade of our coast was effected, and the Mississippi fell under the entire control of the federals, it was plain that to the want of an efficient news the morne and enthusiasm of the geople with interest, as well as many of the southern people-astribuses it to the superior population and greater recourses and of the southern people-astribuses our desires for want of perseverance, manimity, and even of loyalty, on our own part; and the consequent abandonment of the reverance of the southern people astributes our desires for want of perseverance, manimity, and even of loyalty, on our own part; and the consequent abandonment of the reverance of the southern people astributes our desires for want of perseverance, manimity, and even of loyalty, on our own part; and the consequent abandonment of the reverance of the southern people astributes our desires for want of severance, manimity, and even of loyalty, on our own part; and the consequent abandonment of the reverance of the southern people astributes our desired to the southern of the southern states was neither want of search want of search abandonment of the reverance of the southern states and population, not of devotion to held the southern states are not partly of the high crime of undertaking a war without the means of undert they retired—unsuccessful—because they had monountered discontent inflative many labels as consistent of the consistence of the

man has his theory. Plain enough to without the statesman's spectacles, easy enough to be pointed out, now they are glaringly plain to the least of us. But enough—we have to do now with a restored Union—this is a stirorganization of large armies. It would have given the Confederacy a treasury richer than that of the United States. We should thus ring but a melancholy, a very sad narrative—the story of dead hopes—this of General Johnston, but it is also the best, the clearest and ablest we have yet had of the war. It is the work have had to the united States, we should thus have had to the end of the war, the means of paying our soldiers; and that would have enabled such of them as belonged to the laboring class to remain in the ranks. This class, in the Confederacy as in all other countries, formed the back of the army. In all the conformed the body of the army. In all the carlier part of the war, when the Confederate
money was not much below that of the
United States in value, our troops were paid
with some regularity, and the soldiers of the
laboring class who had families, fed and
clothed them with their pay, as they had
fomerly done with the wages of their labor.
And so long as that state of things continued,
the strength of the Confederate armies was
little impaired; and those armies were mainfelined on such a looting as to justify the hope,
which was general in the south until the fall
of issi, thus we were to win in the contest.
But after the Confederate currency had become almost worthless—when a soldier's
month's pay would scarcely buy one meal for
his family—and that was the case in all the
last parted of ten or twelve months—those
soldiers of the laboring class who had familles were compelled to choose believen their
military service and the strongest obligations
men know—their duties to wives and childired. They obeyed the strongest of those obligations, left the army, and returned to their
homes losupport their ramilles. The wretched impressment laws doprived the army of
many valuable men of a class less poor than
that just referred to. Those laws required the
impressment of all articles of military necessity that could not be purchased. The government had the power of regulating the
prices to be paid by it for all such commodiities; and its commissioners appointed for the
purpose fixed them much below the market
values. No one would sell to the government,
or course, when he could get from his neighbors fivince the government price for his horses
or grain; consequently the officers of the government could never purchase, but had always to procure supplies by impressment.
No rules for their guidance were prescribed; formed the body of the army. In all the ear-ler part of the war, when the Confederate of a great man, a man born to be and educated for thoughtful leadership of men, one whose surrender of a high and honorable position in the federal army gave evidence of his right to the highest consideration at the hands of his countrymen, and who in all his subsequent career, during all the changes and chances of the most eventful period of our country's history, sustained himself with dignity, and deported himself with genuine patriotism. We rise from the perusal of this narrative with a better conception of the deservings of General Johnston as a great soldler, and a clearer understanding of his policies and plans as a campaigner and strategist. We know now, not in part, but in whole, the causes operating so disastrously in Tennessee and the adjoining States, and we see how, though hampered at every step by the interference of officials far removed from the scene of operations, he managed to do so much for the south. We cealize, too, his supreme ability as a military critic, and can verify the favorable verdict of federal generals, that his book is a contribution to military scior grain; consequently the officers of the government could never purchase, but had always to procure supplies by impressment. No rules for their guidance were prescribed, none at least that were observed by them or known to the public, and they were subjected to no supervision. All the property of Confiderate citizens applicable to military purposes was, therefore, under their absolute control. The bad and indifferent officers impressed what they were called upon to furnish, in the manner least inconvenient to themseives, usually on the mearest plantations or farms, or those where opposition was not to be apprehended. The farms of soliders were generally under the management of women, and therefore were, not usually, drawn upon for much more than their proportion. Hence it was not uncommon for a solider to be written to by his wife, that so much of the food he had provided for herself and his children had been impressed, that it was accessary that he should return to save them from sufferings or starvation. Such a summons, it may well be supposed, was never unbeeded. The sufferings of the solidiers themselves, produced by the want of proper clothing, drove many of the least hardy out of the ranks. Want of food also is said to have had the same effect, especially in the army before Elcimond, in the last winter of the war. It ence, as well as a narrative of the military operations he guided and directed with such consummate ability. for the mechanical part of the book, it is all we could desire, printed from large, clear-cut type, on the best paper, and illustrated with maps and speaking likenesses of Generals Johnston, Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Bragg, Hardee, Polk, Hood, Stewart and Wade Hampton, of the Confederate, and of McDowell, McClellan, Grant and Sherman, of the federal army. In every

rian of the war between the States," Mr. W. H. Stewart is agent for the sale of the work in Memphis, and will take orders at 317 Main street. Want of food also is said to have had the same effect, especially in the army before fitchmond, in the last winter of the war. It was by such causes, all due to an emply treasury, that our armies were so reduced in the last months of the war. As to the charge of want of loyalty, or read in the war, I assert, from as much opportunity for observation as any individual had, that no people ever displayed so much, under such circumstances, and with so little flagging, for so long a timo continuously. This was proved by the long service of the troops without pay, and under exposure to such hardships, from the causes above mentioned assimates in the proper such as a such carried to the armies from every district that formished a regiment; by the general and continued submission of the people to the tyramy of the impressment a) See the President's telegrams, on page (a) See the President's telegrams, on page 21.

(b) General Holmes tole me in General Lee's presence, Just before '.one tight began on the thirty-first, that be had that force ready to John me when the President should give the order. I have also the written testimony of Colonel Archer Anderson, then of General Holmes's staff, that he brought that number into General Lee's army.

(c) General Lee's army.

(d) General Ripley gave me this number. He brought the first brigade—five thousand men. General Lawton told me that his was six thousand; General Drayton, that his was seven thousand; there was another brigade, of which I do not know the strength.

(d) One thousand. The grainary proportion of one Killed to five wounded gives six thousand. e general and continued successions to the tyrahny of the impressment sien as practised—such a tyrahny, I besve, as no other high-spirited people ever addred—and by the sympathy and sid given the sympathy and sid given the sympathy and sid given the sympathy are sent to belong

sand. (e) The chief of ordinance, Colonel Craig, in his report on the subject, states that but sixty thousand of the arms ordered by Mr. Floyd to be sent to the south were actually removed. FUNNYGRAPHS.

Never pay a bill unless you have the money. Harvard says that "enquire" is right, and Yale says it is "inquire." The ways of women-Anywhere from

"If you are courting a girl," says a California paper, "stick to her, no matter how large her father's feet are." The captain remarks that steeragepassengers ought to be very well behaved, they have so much deck o'er 'em. Pittsburgh is trying to find a man who does not belong to a lodge, grange,

order. When our ancestors wanted a hot rum punch, they said so without evasion; they did not call it "kettled rum." An Oswego woman anvertises that she has purchased a shotgun, and will

club, post, temple, encampment or

shoot any man who gives her husband How happily things turn out. It is now declared that Gladstone has long been very anxious to withdraw from

public life The Wyoming Journal's fees for marringe notices are " as high as the eestacy and liberality of the bridegroom may prompt."

Mrs Green, a Kansas widow, wants to marry again, and, as a recommendation, she says she has used, one broom for fourteen years. A two-cent piece was taken from the

throat of a boy in Portland, Maine, reently, after having been lodged there for six months. There are over ten million women in

America, and yet Tom Hutton, of Geor-gia, hung himself on account of a girl fifteen years old. John Reeves said to his boy, when shaving proved a difficulty, "John, I wish you would not open any more oysters with my razors."

A French paper points out how the passion for gambling is shown in this country, so that even in wedding notices it is necessary to state that there were "no cards." Mr. Marrowfat rather snappishly remarked to his wife, last Sunday, that

a man can't always be thinking of his mmortal soul. He must have time to eat his meals. A malicious politican says the grangers in Illinois turn out to dig the graves

of deceased brothers, thus preventing extortion on the part of that "middle man," the sexton. An Indiana editor mildly remarks: 'If you can't bring us wood, remember

us in your prayers. It is something to know, as we sit and shiver, that we are not forgotton if the stove is cold." That was a practical woman who wrote to Evangelist Hammond, at St. Louis, asking prayers to lift the mortgage on her farm, that she and her little ones

may not be thrown out of a home. At the laying of the corner-stone of the new capitol of Iowa, no speeches were made, except a few remarks by a workman who got his fingers pinched, and they were brief and to the point. A shoemaker out west, with a literary tun of mind has the following poetical gem attached to his shingle:

Have the recent political derange-ments been communicated to the postoffice clock also? In the great race of time the hands on the south side are already seven minutes ahead of those

gress of Montgomery have risen to a comprehension of the magnitude of the crisis and the importance of a ngry the crisis and the crisis and the importance of a ngry the crisis and the crisis and the importance of a ngry the crisis and the importance of a ngry the crisis and the cr

From Ontrain's Lyrics JOHN AND JEAN .- (Antemptial. JOHN SINGS OF JEAN. AtB-"B unfowes hing." Sonny Jeanie! Artiess Jeanie! Rosy, cozy Jeanie!

Wort thou mine!

How wad I adore you!

What could I do for you!

Think on what I swore you-See if I repine! Try to yex me,
Pester or perplex ma—
A' your little sex may,
To bother ane O' mine!
Wreck me—break L. b—
Lick me—kick me—
Only let me think the
Wee bit foot was thine. without how income JOHN TELLS OF JEAN. (To a tune of his own composing.) Oh! what a deevil, a deevil, a deevil, Oh! what a deevil is Jean! The life o'n deevil I read wi' the deevil, An'she cares deevil a preen!

the dands wi'the poker, but no at the coals, Her toungs an' her temper are out o'a' rules; She dings at my head wi' a dizzen o' shools. And then she bawis out, "Mind your een!" Oh! what a deevil, etc.

She seizes the kailpat, an' i get my share; The stoom spend line best of their time in the air. An' sittin' is no the right use for a chair. As I an' my shattered banes ken. Oh! what a deevil, etc. She plays at the ba'wi' my head every day, An' whee I fa'o'er she cress out-Hurrah! An' she's got a great cuddle-heel to her shae An' I've got a patch for my een! Oh! what a deevil, etc.

As For she plays rowley-powley wi' them at my An' she says that it's punishment for's a' at ance, Like killin' twa dogs wi' ae bane. Oh! what a deevil, etc.

I'm sae muckle accustomed to lounders and That when I'm asleep she canna wake me wi' kicks, Though her fit is as heavy as baith o' Aukt Nick's, No' countin' the weight o' her shoon. Oh! what a deevil, etc. respect it is a complete "contribution of materials for the use of the future histo-

She dads at me sae, that whate'er I may do, I am ac single lump just a' through an through.
And every bit o'my body is blue,
Except twa three bits that are green!
Oh! what a decyll, etc.

THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF EDIN-SURGH. A WELCOME BY MR. ALFRED TENNYSON, THER POST LAUREATS.

The Son of him with whom we strove for power-Whose will is lord thro' all his world do-Who made the serf a man, and burst his ensin-Has given our prince his own imporial flower. Alexandrowns. And welcome, Russian flower, a people's pride, To Britain, when her flowers begin to blow! From love to love, from home to hame yo From mother unto mother, stately bride, Marie A,lexandrowns,

The golden news along the steppes is blown, And at thy name the Tartar tents are stirred; Elbors and all the Caucasus have heard; And all the sultry paleus of India known, The voices of our universal sea.
On capes of Africas on cliffs of Kent,
The Mauris and that isle of Continent,
And loyal pines of Canada murmur thee,
Marie Alexandrowna. Alexamirowna

Fair empires beauchting, both, in lasty life!— Yet Harold's England fell to Norman swords; Yet thine o are land has bow'd to Tariar Since English Harold gave its throne a wife, For throngs and peoples are as waifs that swing; And fior to fall, in endless ebb and flow; But who love best have best the grace to brown That Love by right divine is deathless king,

IV. And Love has led thee to the stranger land. Where men are bold and strongly say their Say;
See, empire upon empire stolles to-day.
As then with thy young lover hand in hand
Alexandrowns!
So now thy folier life is in the West. Whose hand at home was gracious to thy poor;
Thy name was blest within the narrow door;
Here also, Marie, shall thy name be blest,
Marie Alexandrowna!

nall lears and jealous hatreds flame again! Or at thy coming, princess, everywhere, The blue beaven break, and some diviner eathe thro' the world and change the hearts

But hearts that change not, love that cannot cease, And peace be yours, the peace of soul in soul! And however this wild world may roll, Between your peoples truths and manful peace, Alfred-Alexandrowns!

> PAREPA-ROSA. BY EDWARD HING.

From Seribner's for April.] From Seribner's for April.]

O spirit, disembodied though thou art,
I cling to thee, and cannot let thee go!
Thy voice rings through the chambers of my heart!
Its subtle music echoes all my woe,
Its perfect passion, its consummate path,
Its dreamy rapture and its lority range
Thrill with a sorrow-laden joy my brain.
Ah, sweet dead singer! It is said and strange
To lose with thee the harmony of life;
Why could not gentle beath deign to foresee
That all our souls would be with discord rife
If in his round he placed his hand on thee?
E'on he shall learn the silence to hate,
And half regret he sealed thy sudden fate.

Pan will not rise to tune his reed again! Pan will not rise to tune his reed again?
Fair Approdite, with her foam-tipped shell
Willspring no more from bosom of the main,
Her mad, melodious tale of love to te fl;
The light that shone-from great Apoll o's brow
Is dulled beneath the shade of cen turies;
The harp of David is neglected now,
And Orpheus into black obliviou, flees;
The song of Sappho is remembered not;
Yet spirit, may thy voice escape the lot.
The world forgets the giorious Malibran;
That gives to brightest fame so brief a span;
Since its transcendent parity may chaim.
For thy lost presence an eternal name.

Like to that splendid Swede who swayed the souls
Of prince and peasant, dids't them live and sing; so long as Time's firm hand they ears outroils. The memories of ye twain shall bloom in

The memories of ye twain shall bloom in spring.

The nightingale your melodies shall chant, For she alone of all the birds can know How near ye were to nature; her romaunt Ontlives the ages' solemn cho and flow. And if some eve the birdling sweeter cries. Than c'er before—transfigured by her pains; if closer home to Heaven her carol files.

And catches music from celestial strains; Then shall she make thy notes her noblest choice— O stainless lady of the matchless voice!

To show how nearly like reason is animal instinct, an anecdote is related in reference to self-protection by animais. A few years ago a par y of travelers were exploring Paraguay, where the plains abound in horses and the forests in pumas and other wild animals. They saw a mare with a pair of twin colts, and stealing near them were a pair of pum as, while at a little distance were a herd of horses,